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The Robert Schuman Centre's Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the 
development of interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern 
Europe. Challenges, opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European 
Union in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe are at the centre of 
attention. The scope and style of papers in the series is varied, however, two 
areas of research have been prioritized: 
1/ The EU Enlargement Eastward: Utility, Visibility, Implications 
2/ Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe 
Visitors invited to the Institute under the auspices of the Centre's Programme, as 
well as researchers at the Institute, are eligible to contribute. 
This paper was written for a meeting of the Reflection Group on the Diversity 
and Unity in the Enlarged European Union, set up jointly by the Robert 
Schuman Centre and the Group of Advisors at the European Commission, and 
chaired by Professor Jean-Luc Dehaene. The European University Institute and 
the Robert Schuman Centre are not responsible for the proposals and opinions 
expressed by the author. For information on this and other projects on Eastern 
Europe at the Robert Schuman Centre, please contact Professor Jan Zielonka 
(zielonka@datacomm.iue.it). 
Introduction"' 
The development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) within 
the European Union (EU) has followed a remarkably capricious pattern. As a 
relatively new policy domain within the EU, it has been approached with 
caution and suspicion by politicians in the member States, who have implicitly 
or explicitly expressed resentment at relinquishing national control in 
sovereigntywsensitive areas, such as immigration and asylum control, police and 
judicial co-operation, and the fight against transnational organised crime, fraud 
and corruption. On the other hand, national politicians have embraced the 
construction of the AFSJ as an opportunity to turn the EU into a joint internal 
security enterprise which should bring the EU closer to the citizens of Europe. 
The latter approach has emerged particularly since the special Council Summit 
which was convened in Tampere during the Finnish Presidency and which was 
solely developed to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation. The 
institutionalisation trend which was reinforced at the Tampere summit -
particularly through the endorsement of the creation of Eurojust and the 
European Police College - has however been fettered by nested games and 
bargaining processes. 
The objective of the underlying paper is to look at aspects of this two-
folded process, in particular in view of the incumbent enlargement of the EU. 
The JHA Chapter constitutes a formidable hurdle1 for candidate countries, as it 
demands not merely the assimilation of legal provisions (Title IV TEU, Title VI 
TEU and the Schengen acquis) into the respective domestic laws, but also 
revision - if not reform - of national institutions (police, customs, public 
prosecution, judiciary) and instruments of control (border control, data exchange 
systems, etc.). Except for this magnificent challenge, the candidate countries are 
faced with the necessity to implement the relevant legal provisions at once. This 
applies in particular in view of the Schengen acquis: no transitory periods in the 
field of JHA are in principle allowed for the new member states, as they are 
required to satisfy the requirements of the acquis at the moment of their 
accession. Specific rules concerning the implementation and abolition of the 
internal border controls will be regulated in the Accession Treaties. The 
* Paper commissioned for the Reflection Group on "Diversity and Unity in the Enlarged 
European Union: What Influences the Process of Transition and Adaptation in Central and 
East Europe?", Chaired by Jean-Luc Dehaene, 21-22 June, Brussels. 
1 Monica den Beer and Gilles de Kerchove, "A Hurdled Admission: The Integration of the 
Candidate Countries into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice", in Vincent 
Kronenberger (Ed.), The European Union and the lntemazional Legal Order- Discord and 
Hannony, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 2001, pp. 315-329; see also -specifically in 
relation to policing- Frank Gregory, "Good Cops": Issues related to EU Enlargement and 
the "Police" Requirements of the JHA acquis, Working Paper 24/01, "One Europe or 
Several?", ESRC Research Programme, on p. 6. 
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effective implementation of the requirements of the acquis will be verified 
before the completion of the relevant Accession Treaty negotiations or at the 
latest before the ratification of the Accession Treaty concerned. 
The crux in the debate about these requirements is whether they can be 
considered fair and consistent when practices are compared between the 
evolution of JHA between the current EU member states and the imposition of 
instruments of control on the new member states. One of the most peitinent 
differences is that within the current circle of member states, a great deal of 
fleXibility has been allowed (and sometimes even encouraged!), whilst none of 
that flexibility seems to be allowed vis-3.-vis the new member states. In 
discussing these apparent double standards2, we will frrst undertake an excursion 
into past and actual practice within the Schengen area, and then move on to a 
more general analysis of JHA. 
One of the principal objectives of this working paper is to explore the 
application of flexibility in the application and implementation of the Schengen 
acquis, and more widely of the JHA acquis, by the candidate countries. 
Although generally the dominant assumption (still) is that enlargement will 
follow the "big bang" procedure, alias simultaneous accession by all candidates 
minus Romania and Bulgaria, there are increasingly strong voices to be heard 
that accession should perhaps follow a more flexible path - particularly also in 
the field of internal security. The principal argument of this paper is that whilst 
multi-speed integration in the Schengen-regime may be costly, time-
consuming3, technically awkward4 and politically sensitive, from a perspective 
of precedent, pragmatism, fairness and symmetry it may be the most viable 
solution to go forward. 
2 Summary of report entitled The Long-Tenn Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of 
the New Border, Final Report of the Reflection Group, Chairman Giuliano Amato, 
Rapporteur Judy Batt, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (European 
University Institute) with the Forward Studies Unit (European Commission), on p. 5. See also 
p. 57 and 58: " On the one hand, the EU- quite rightly- expects quite high standards in the 
field of human rights and the treatment of refugees on the part of prospective new member 
states. On the other hand, ... (T)he pressures to toughen up controls and policing on the 
eastern borders are hard to reconcile with the EU' s declared aim of promoting democratic and 
liberal administrative practices in Central and Eastern Europe." 
3 Malcolm Anderson, ''The Transformation of Border Controls: A European Precedent?", 
Extract from P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds.), The Wall around the West: State Borders and 
Immigration Controls in North America and Europe, Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 
4 Centre for European Reform (CER), Brussels, June 20, 2001 (Reuters). 
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Flexibility in the Schengen Area5 
The Schengen acquis was incorporated into the framework of the European 
Union when the Treaty on European Union (TEU) entered into force on 1 May 
1999. The absorption of the free movement of persons' laboratory into the TEU 
heralded the provisional ending of a dual legal, institutional and political 
trajectorl. Until the moment of incorporation, a majority of 13 EU Member 
States 7 had jointly paved the way for reinforced cooperation in multiple areas, 
such as external borders control, asylum policy, and police and justice 
cooperation. in criminal matters. Article 18 of the EC Treaty (TEC) lays the 
foundation for the realisation of a free movement of persons area, which is 
extended with a series of flanking measures intended to compensate for the 
abolition of internal border controls. 
The incorporation of the Schengen acquis was accompanied by a partial 
conununitarisation process, in which some elements of the previous Title VI 
were lifted to the new Title IV TEU. This Title, entitled "Visas, Asylum, 
Immigration and other Policies related to the Free Movement of Goods", is an 
integral part of the progressive establishment of an AFSJ. Measures pertaining 
to the abolition of internal border controls, external borders, visa policy, asylum, 
refugees, innnigration policy, legally resident third country nationals, and 
judicial cooperation in civil matters now form part of EC law. 
From the outset, Schengen was launched as a temporary initiative in order 
to test a common framework of internal security control and to gradually expand 
this framework to the whole European Community. Only in the final stages of 
the IGC-negotiations before the Amsterdam sununit, the proposal was launched 
to integrate Schengen into the EU-framework. This integration was meant to 
bring an end to the undesirable external institutional, political and legal 
existence outside the European Union.8 Despite the fact that the Schengen 
acquis was brought within the framework of the EU, a colourful integration 
pattern has emerged which bears a striking resemblance to the 'variable 
5 This section draws heavily on my paper entitled To What Extent Can There Be Flexibility in 
the Application of the New Member States?, which was presented at the CEPS/SITRA/Stefan 
Batory conference "New European Borders and Security Cooperation: Promoting Trust in an 
Enlarged European Union", Brussels, 6 and 7 July 2001. 
6 See e.g. Monica den Boer and Laura Corrado, "For the Record or Off the Record: 
Comments About the Incorporation of Schengen into the EU", European Journal of 
Migration and Law, 1999, Volume 1, No. 4, 397-418. 
7 All EU Member States with the exception of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
8 Monica den Boer, ''The Incorporation of Schengen into the TEU: A Bridge Too Far?", in 
JOrg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels (Eds.), The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges and 
Opportunities for the European Union, London, Continuum, 2000, pp. 297-319. 
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geometry' model of f!exibi!ity9 Within the AFSJ, five different configurations 
of countries can currently be distinguished: 
• EU member states committed to creating an AFSJ minus the EU member 
states that negotiated an opt-out with respect to Title IV TEC (United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark); 10 
• 13 EU member states that signed the Schengen Agreements and thus 
constitute the core group that jointly developed the Schengen acquis; 11 
• The same 13 EU member states plus the two associated members Iceland 
and Norway12, who together with the United Kingdom and Ireland form 
the so-called Mixed Committee; 13 
9 Helen Wallace notes that "Bundled together in the vocabulary of flexibility were: changes in 
the context and conditions for integration; variations in the objectives of the actors involved; 
differences in the interests of the actors; controversies about which values and norms should 
be embedded in the process; debates about the feasible and desirable policy scope for shared 
reaimes; and questioning of the institutional rules and practices through which to devel~p 
poiicy regimes.", in "Flexibility: A Tool of Integration of a Restraint ~n Disintegration?", m 
Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener (Eds.), European lntegratzon after Amsterdam: 
Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, 
pp. 175-191, at p. 178. See also: Alexander C.-G. Stubb, 'A Categorization of Differentiated 
Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1996, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 283-295; O,eoffrey 
Edwards and Eric Philippart, Flexibility and the Treaty of Amsterdam: Europe s New 
Byzantium?, Cambridge, CEKS Occasional Paper, No. 3, Novem?er 1~97; . Gille~ de 
Kerchove, 'Un espace de liberte, de securite et de justice aux dtmenswns mcertames: 
Quelques reflexions sur le recours aux cooperations renforc6es en matiere de justice. et 
d'affaires int6rieures', in Coping with Flexibility and Legitimacy after Amsterdam, Momca 
den Boer, Alain Guggenbiihl, Sophie Vanhoonacker (Eds.), Maastricht, EIPA, 1998 pp 197-
204. 
10 Title IV TEC, Article 69: 'The application of this Title shall be subject to the provisions of 
the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland and to th~ P:otocol on t~e 
position of Denmark and without prejudice to the Protocol on the appl~cat:J.on of ce~am 
aspects of Article 14 of the Treaty establishing the European Cornmumty to the Umted 
Kin adorn and to Ireland.'; Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article ?a of the 
Tre:ty establishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and Ireland; Protocol on 
the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
11 The Schengen acquis as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 
May 1999, OJ L 239,22 September 2000, p.l. The Schengen acquis consists ?f the follow~ng 
elements: Agreement signed in Schengen on 14 June 1985; ImplementatiOn Conv~n.tlOn 
signed in Schengen on 19 June 1990; Accession Protocols and Agreements; and DeclSlons 
and declarations adopted by the Executive Committee as well as acts adopted by the organs 
upon which it has conferred decision making powers. 
ti Application de l'acquis de Schengen dans les pays nordiques a partir du 25 mars 2001, doe. 
6229/01 SCH/EV AL 11 COMIX 121, 26.02.01, Counseil AG (2331eme) pt. Al4. 
13 See: OJ L 176/31, 10.7.99, Council Decision of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for 
the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of t?ose two 
States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acqms'; OJ C 
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• The 13 "Schengen" EU Member States together with the partial 
participants (UK, Ireland) who requested an opt~in with respect to certain 
elements of the Schengen acquis; 14 
• Last but not least, the group of States that are awaiting accession to the 
EU and which will have to implement the Schengen acquis. 15 
Except for the various configurations of EU-Member States, non EU Member 
States and applicant countries, various forms of flexibility are being applied to 
areas of internal security, such as: 
• Gradual lifting of border controls upon accession to Schengen, e.g. first 
land borders, followed by airports and maritime controls; 
• Different arrangements for operational law enforcement action in foreign 
territory, of the Schengen partner (for instance different geographical 
penetration zones in the context of 'hot pursuit'); 
• Article 2 -2 the Schengen Implementing Convention, which provides the 
temporary re-establishment of internal border controls when the internal 
security of a Schengen partner state is at stake; 
• Opt-in which allows a partial participation in the Schengen acquis; the 
UK and Ireland will do this without relinquishing their internal border 
controls. 
The evolution of the Schengen-regime is riddled with diverse forms of 
antagonism, and alternating discourses of trust and distrust16. The period which 
211/9, 23.7.99, Council decision of 17 May 1999 on the conclusion of the Agreement with the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis; OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, 
pp 35-52, Council decision No 1/1999 of the EU/Iceland and Norway Mixed Committee 
established by the agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the 
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latter's association in the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis of 29 June 1999 
adopting its Rules of Procedure; OJ C 211, 23.7.1999, pp 9-11. 
14 Council decision of 29 May 2000 concerning the request of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis; OJ 
Ll31, 1.6.2000, pp 43-47. 
15 Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union 
(Protocol to the TEU, 1997). Article 8 of this protocol provides that: "For the purposes of the 
negotiations for the admission of new Member States into the European Union, the Schengen 
acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall be regarded as an 
acquis which must be accepted in full by all States candidates for admission". The scope of 
the requirement spelled out in this provision is somewhat unclear. It might mean that the full 
implementation of the Schengen acquis is no longer a pre-condition for the abolition of 
checks on persons at the internal borders but a precondition for accession to the European 
Union. 
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was leading up to the entry into force of the Schengen system was marked by 
various vicissitudes, such as the spilling over of Algerian terrorism into France 
and the increase in the number of asylum seekers. There are various other 
examples too. One is the dismayal which was expressed by one of the founding 
fathers of the European Communities - Italy - about not bemg mvolved m the 
first inner circle of Schengen partners, which was formed by France, Germany 
and the Benelux countries. Another example is the delay in the Schengen 
neo-otiations subsequent to the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the need to refurnish 
th; security at the external border between the EU and Poland. A~so wit~in this 
category is the unilateral decision by the French Government to remstall m~ernal 
border controls between itself and Belgium and Luxembourg respectively, 
which was justified on the basis of concerns about the 'influx' of drugs from the 
Netherlands. 17 And finally, a prime obstacle in the history of Schengen has been 
the difficulty to achieve sufficient confidence in each other's ability to guard the 
external borders on behalf of the other partners. Political concern was expressed 
in the Dutch parliament about the quality of Greece's external border controls 
when Greece siO'ned up to the Schengen Convention. This concern -which also 
applied to Italy
0
- was strongly fed by media images of ships swamped with 
would-be-immi=ts from Turkey and Iraq, and which became budding blocks 
in political arg:mentation; it resulted in postponement and stage-wise aboliti?n 
of border controls in these countries. The list of misgivings can be extended With 
other items, such as discussions concerning the quality of each other's data-input 
into the Schengen Information System and the perceived weaknesses of some 
(illegal) immigration control systems. 
The discourse of trust and distrust seems to have contributed to the 
tolerance of flexibility in the application of the Schengen regime. The strongest 
example of flexibility being allowed is the above mentioned opt-in protocol 
which was o-ranted to the United Kingdom and Ireland. Recently, we have 
witnessed s~me instances of flexibility in the temporary intensification of 
internal security controls between the current Schengen partners. Examples 
include: 
16 Neil Walker, The Problem of Trust in an Enlarged Area of Freedom, Security and Ju;_tice: 
A Conceptual Analysis, Paper presented at CEPS~~tr:RAJStefan. Batory conference New 
European Borders and Security Cooperation: Prorll:otmg Trust m an Enlarged European 
Union", Brussels, 6 and 7 July 2001. 
17 Monsieur Paul Masson, S6nateur du Loiret, Rapport sur la Convention d'Application de 
!'Accord de Schengen, 31 janvier 1996. 
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• The Netherlands introduced the temporary reinforcement of the expulsion 
policy by the Dutch border control authorities during the Euro 2000 
charnpionships 18; 
• Austria intensified its border controls for the period of a week between 1 
and 3 July 2001, which hosted a world economic forum for Eastern 
Europe and suspended the Schengen Agreement to diminish a repetition 
of the riots in Gothenburg. 19 
• Italy temporarily suspended the Schengen Agreement when it hosted the 
GS-summit from 20 to 22 July 2001 in Genova. 
• Following the events in Genova, the Danish police have demanded that 
the Danish government suspends the Schengen Convention and allows 
increased control at the Danish borders prior to the EU Summits which 
are to be held in Cofenhagen during the Danish EU Presidency in the 
second half of 20022 
The lack of trust also seems to be a dominant feature in the enlargement process. 
Central and East Europeans have ventured some frustration about the lack of 
trust in their crime-fighting abilities, when it is not even that successful in the 
current member states of the EU.21 The management of trust should be embraced 
as one of the leading diplomatic strategies, particularly in view of the fact that 
also between the law enforcement agencies of the current member states trust is 
not sufficient to exchange intelligence on transnational organised crime via 
Europol. Trust-building in the domain of internal security could possibly benefit 
from increased trans-regional (law enforcement) co-operation22. But how does 
one strike a proper balance between the need for decentralised, transregional or 
18 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 227, nr. 29. EU-legislation prevented the 
possibility of immediate expulsion of EU·citizens after committing petty criminal offences; 
hence, the Dutch authorities decided to raise the expulsion limit to a sentence for a criminal 
fact with a 'threat penalty' of minimally 4 years. In this case, expulsion would apply to EU· 
citizens sentenced to paying a fine but at the same time having been sentenced to the 4 year 
penalty. As far as the temporary re· introduction of border controls was concerned (Article 2~2 
Schengen Implementing Convention), the Dutch Royal Military Constabulary drafted a 
special scenario which tackled the factual border control at the border with Germany, airports 
and the North Sea coast. 
19 JAI in zhe News, 29 June 2001. 
2
° Copenhagen, Press Review, quoted in JAJ in the News 
21 Remarks to this extent were raised during the discussion about the draft of this paper 
between the members of the Reflection Group. 
22 See also the Commission White Paper on Governance: 
http://europa.eu.int/comrnlgovernancelindex_en.htm. 
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even tailor-made solutions and the need for standardised practices which are 
mutually recognised? 
Implementation, Differentiation and Homogenisation in AFSJ between 
Current EU member states 
The adoption and implementation of the impressive list of legal instruments 
(including conventions, joint actions, joint positions, framework decisions and 
decisions) confronts lawyers and policy officials in the candidate countries with 
a serious challenge, certainly when we realise that the implementation has to be 
done at once. This requirement contributes to the image that the EU Member 
States are neat performers when it concerns ratification and implementation of 
(binding) legal instruments. 
That impression should however be avoided: specifically in Title VI, 
which is an intergovernmental arena of law-making, there is a tendency to 
conclude agreements which hold political value but which can be considered as 
legal compromises. Many of the instruments adopted by the JHA-Council are 
so-called 'soft instruments', such as reconnnendations or resolutions, and can 
thus not be regarded as enforceable within national legislation. Moreover, the 
binding legal instruments that are adopted often take several years before 
ratification is completed. None of the Title VI conventions concluded since the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty has been fully ratified, with the 
exception of the Customs Information System Convention and the Europol 
Convention. The latter took 'only' three years between signature and 
ratification, but we should be mindful of the fact that this relatively short period 
was the outcome of forceful political pressure from both the Commission and 
the successive Presidencies. Following the Tampere summit in October 1999, 
the European Commission introduced a 'scoreboard' 23 which allows a regular 
inventory of the state of affairs concerning ratification and implementation. The 
scoreboard should introduce peer review and competition, but the Commission 
lacks incentives as no hard sanctions can be enforced in this intergovernmental 
area of policy-making. A major conclusion which can be drawn from this patchy 
pattern within the EU is that despite active lavvmaking in the field of Justice and 
Home Affairs Co-operation, we are still far removed from harmonisation 
between national criminal justice systems in the current EU member states. This 
observation is not meant to encourage the candidate countries to sit back and 
23 http://europa.eu.int/comrnfdgs/justice~home/pdf/com2001-278-nl.pdf; Commissie van de 
Europese Gemeenschappen, Mededeling van de Commissie aan de Raad and het Europees 
Parlement, Haljjaarlijkse Bijwerking van het Scorebord van de vorderingen op het gebied van 
de totstandbrenging van een ruimte van "Vrijheid, Veiligheid en Rechtvaardigheid" in de 
Europese Unie (le Halfjaar 2001 ), Brussel, 23.05.01, COM (2001) 278 definitief. 
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relax, but to place the implementation record of EU Member States in a more 
realistic perspective. 
Another ob~ervation -already raised in the introduction - is that the 
evolution of the AFSJ is marred by ambivalence. One the one hand, we see a 
strong tendency towards differentiation strategies, which mainly come about 
because the speed of the integration is often determined by the most reluctant 
member states. This differentiation or heterogeneity is likely to increase with the 
expansion ofEU membership.24 
J?ifferentiation in AFSJ is paralleled by the pursuance of homogenisation 
stra:egtes. The latter emerge in the form of politically persistent agenda's to 
achteve connnon standards and harmonisation throughout the whole EU. In 
particular the Corpus Juris project of the European Commission, with concrete 
proposals to establish a European Prosecutor with regard to the control of fraud 
and money-laundering against the European Community (a proposal that did not 
m~e it at the Nice. summit), can be regarded as a longstanding political project 
whtch eventually ru.ms at criminal law harmonisation and the establishment of a 
European Judicial Space. As far as asylum and migration are concerned which 
have become policy issues falling under Community competence, there has also 
bee.n a long-standi.ng trajectory to establish a connnon asylum and immigration 
policy. The Belgmn Presidency of the EU has made this also one of its 
priorities. 25 
~he p~rsuance of a common asylum and migration policy can be regarded 
as an mhentage of the Tampere summit, which approved an ambitious and 
detailed action progrannne that leading to the progressive establishment of a 
co~on area of freedom, security and justice. According to the Belgian Prime 
Mmtster Guy Verhofstadt, this must be an open area subject to controls based on 
t~e ~u~op~an principles of openness, freedom, hospitality, solidarity, non-
discnmmatwn, respect for human rights, human dignity and the values of a 
multicu~t_l:Iral society. Where asylum is concerned, the emphasis will be on 
harmo~1smg the ~ro?edures for granting asylum and on hosting refugees. At the 
same time, the pnnctple to protect refugees must not be called into question. On 
the ?th~r h~nd~ the Belgian Presidency argues that it is also important to achieve 
a farr d~stnbutwn of the burden and to determine with accuracy which member 
state wlll be responsible for processing a given asylum application. Cynical 
observers may argue that the burden-sharing issue has been on the Justice and 
: Helen Walla~e, 200?, .P· 185, referring to Wallace and Wallace, 1995. 
Speech by Pnme M1mster Guy Verhofstadt, "The Belgian Presidency of the European 
Union: Key Themes and Challenges", 
http://www .eu200 1. be/MalnJFrameset. asp ?reference=O l-
&lang=en&sess=l005514624&01&lang::::en&sess=1005514624& 
11 
-:y:'''~ _-Ho_~~~ffairs agenda for nearly a decade, without, however, major political 
,_ __ bniakth~ughs being achieved. Neither has the Dublin Asyl~m Convenhon been 
~~~_:l:ieralde~ as a great success. The Belgian Presidency will pres~n~ the first 
'"·"' '"'progt'\:~ report on a connnon asylum policy at the European Council m Laeken. 
A§._,JAt as immigration is concerned, the Presidency anns to encourage t~e 
O::_. -T(?ft\liting of an overarching policy that takes account of the many ~acets of. ~IS 
issue: prevention and the development of partnerships with countnes of ?ngm, 
the mana<Yement of migratory flows, integration and employment. Moreover, the Presiden~y has signalled that it is finnly committed to steppi~g up the fig?t 
against illegal immigration, especially with regard to the trafficking and trade m 
human beings. 
Implementing the Schengen/JHA acquis: A Beauty Contest? 
One of the questions that needs to be addressed is wh:ther or. not. the t~n 
countries currently queuing up for accession in 2004 (Estoma, Latv1a, Lithuania, 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) 
are likely to achieve the standards of the Schengen I JHA regime. Sigmficant 
-demands are imposed on the candidate countries in terms of transpo~Ihon ~d 
integration of the acquis into their domestic legal systems. In ~ special art~cle 
devoted to the consequences of Schengen accession by the candidate countnes, 
the Oxford Analytic a Brief' mentions the following aspects: 
1. New extemal borders around the European Union: Once the current 13 
candidates have all joined- "if they all do" - the Union will gain further 
common borders with Russia and new borders with Belarus, Ukrame, 
Moldova, Croatia and Yugoslavia on the European continent. With ~e 
accession of Turkey, the Union would gain conunon borders with 
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. . . 
2. ~Border Management systems:. Since EU candidates have to J.om the 
Schengen regime when accedmg to the EU, they are ~espo?sible for 
ensurina tight control of their borders with third states, which will become 
external borders of the enlarged EU. The implementation of the Schengen 
acquis will generate problems on borders between ~an.d~dates not 
accedin<Y simultaneously. For instance, if the Czech Repubhc JOms the EU 
before Siovakia, the interstate border will temporarily be an external one 
and require effective control; this prospect is sensitive as the two states of 
the former Czechoslovakia peacefully separated in 1993 and never 
seriously considered the establishment of controls at their comm?n 
border. Another example is the border between Hungary and Romama. 
This common frontier will remain an external border for at least a few 
26 17 July 2001. 
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years as Hungary's accession to the EU will be several years before that 
of Romania; in this case, the situation is complicated by the fact that 
Romania has a large ethnic Hungarian population (between 1 and 2 
million people)27. In addition, changes to border management with third 
countries will have logistical and socio-economic implications. Moreover, 
there is a sharp imbalance between the burden of controlling the external 
border in 'front-line' countries (e.g. Poland, Romania and Greece, as well 
as Turkey when/if it joins) and in 'rearguard' countries: some of the EU 
15 will no longer have external land borders after enlargement (not will 
the Czech Republic, once Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have joined). 
3. Cultural shift: Formerly, the East European states were not used to 
pressures of illegal irnmigration28, trafficking in human beings and drug 
trafficking. They carried out "classical" border surveillance, generally 
using military means. The process of modernisation requires 
demilitarisation of border guards and a transformation into a professional 
border police service with civilian status and the introduction of new 
policing methods. 
4. Heavy investments: Aligning the border management of the candidates to 
Schengen!EU standards requires heavy investments in human resources 
and equipment, such as modern devices for surveillance and 
conununications. Substantial funds are dedicated to the realisation of this 
objective, e.g. through the Phare programme. 
5. The introduction of (new) socio-economic barriers: Tighter border 
controls between the new EU members and third countries poses 
dilemmas (e.g. the erection of a barrier between Poland and Ukraine29, 
27 
For the question of Hungarian minorities, see Judit T6th, The Application of JHA and the 
Position of Minorities - The Case of Hungarian Minorities, presented at CEPS I SITRA I 
Stefan Batory Foundation Conference, Brussels, 6 and 7 July 2001; see also statistics 
presented by Andre Liebich, Ethnic Minorities and the Long-Term Implications of EV 
Enlargement, paper commissioned for the Reflection Group Amato, June 1998. 
28 
For an elaborate account on the management of migration in the Baltic states, see: 
International Organisation for Migration, Managing Migration in the Baltic States in the 
Framework of the EU Enlargement Process, 2000 (http://www.iom.int). 
29 
Germany believes that the movement of the Schengen frontier to the Polish!Ukrainian 
border should be delayed for 7 to 10 years. On the one hand, there is talk about "double 
perimeter defences", in which case the German!Polish and the Polish!Ukrainian border would 
be hard frontiers and the Poles would fully implement Schengen (according to this scenario, if 
a Ukrainian wanted to enter Germany he/she would require a Polish visa and a Schengen visa 
and cross two hard borders); on the other hand, there is the scenario of the "canal lock 
system", which would allow complete fluidity between Poland and the EU and between 
Poland and Ukraine; in this case, the Schengen frontier would remain at the German!Polish 
border and Poland would continue to implement the Schengen acquis. From: Introductory 
statement by Malcolm Anderson, Policy Alternatives to Schengen Border Controls on the 
Future EU External Frontier, Proceedings of an Expert Seminar, by Malcolm Anderson, 
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between Romania and Moldova, or the new border control regime· that 
will apply to the Russian province and enclave Kaliningrad30), which may 
strain bilateral links and economic ties. Some of these immediate 
drawbacks could be relieved by improved visa-processing. 
Another challenge not to be trivialised is that the Title VI acquis is being 
developed at rapid speed. During the Swedish Presidency in the first half of 
2001, 47 decisions alone were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council.31 An important aspect of the EU re-accession strategy is that all 
candidate countries integrate the EU acquis communitaire into their domestic 
legal systems. To realise this undertaking, they are assisted by Accession 
Partnerships (AP's), which provide an assessment of the priorities and the 
financial support to achieve these priorities. At its summit at Santa Maria Da 
Feira in June 2000, the European Council observed that "progress in the 
(accession) negotiations depends on the incorporation by the candidate states of 
the acquis in their national legislation and especially in their capacity to 
effectively implement and enforce it." This includes indeed integration of the 
EU acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs Co-operation, which 
encompasses migration management issues such as asylum law and practice, 
external border management, visa policy and the combating of illegal trafficking 
in human beings.32 The Enlargement Strategy Paper of2000 draws the attention 
to the following domains which are part of the chapter on Justice and Home 
Affairs co-operation, and that still require attention in most candidate countries: 
• Public administration and the judiciary are to be modernised cq. 
strengthened, as they are of crucial importance in the implementation of 
the acquis and the transition process. Training of civil servants and judges 
needs to be sustained. 
• Corruption is still seen as a major problem. It is assumed that this 
phenomenon is exacerbated by low salaries in the public sector and the 
Joanna Apap and Christopher Mulkins, Warsaw, 23-24 February 2001, Organised by CEPS, 
Batory Foundation and eo-financed by the SITRA Foundation, on p. 7 and 8. 
30 The questions surrounding Kaliningrad and the implementation of a visa regime is much 
discussed topic; see e.g. Anderson 2001, p. 15 and 16, supra note 29. See also Policy Papers 
1, Overcoming Alienation: Kaliningrad as a Russian Enclave Inside the European Union, 
Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, January 2001 (www.batory.org.pl); see also Olga 
Potemkina, Russia's Engagement with the JHA and the Question of Mutual Trust, at 
CEPS/SITRAJStefan Batory conference, Brussels, 6 and 7 July 2001. 
31 Lists of adopted Title VI instruments can be viewed at the site of the Council of the 
European Union; http://ue.eu.int/jai/default.asp?lang=nl 
32 Ryszard Cholewinski, "Introduction", in International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
Managing Migration in the Baltic States in the Framework of the EU Enlargement Process, 
2000, at p. 1. 
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use of extensive controls in the economy. Corruption, fraud and economic 
crime are widespread in most candidate countries. 
• Trafficking in women and children is a growing problem in certain 
candidate countries, despite legal prohibition. Candidate countries have 
become countries of origin, transit (see case on Poland as transit country 
below), and destination (final embarkation). Significant efforts (the 
Enlargement Strategy Paper also mentions "vigorous measures") are still 
·required to prevent such trafficking. 
Other issues frequently mentioned include the data protection regime 
(requirements with regard to the Schengen Information System and Europol), 
and the national infrastructure in law enforcement organisations and 
immigration services (telecorrununication, infrastructure at airports, Schengen 
teams and operational powers, etc.). When drawing up an inventory of 
regulatory instruments and policies in separate candidate countries, impressions 
seem to vary33 : 
BULGARIA Significant efforts are still required despite new regulatory 
instruments, modernisation of equipment, and demilitarisation of 
the police. The overall assessment includes: Data Protection Law 
to be adopted which is in line with the acquis; despite alignment 
of its visa-regime with the EU there is ·still visa-free movement 
with e.g. Russia, Georgia and Ukraine; re-admission agreements 
to be concluded with UK and Ireland; Bulgaria receives few 
refugees; family reunification regulation needs to be brought in 
line; national information system compatible with SIS to be 
established; further training police professionals required in the 
field of human rights; police equipment to be modernised; overall 
strategy against drugs required; difficulties with mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters; weaknesses in regulations 
concerning money laundering; interagency co-operation to be 
improved. 
ESTONIA 1981 European Convention on Data Protection still to be ratified· 
visa practice to be professionalised (visa sticker and electroni~ 
data-exchange); common border controls system to be introduced 
(border controls are however rather efficient); considerable 
reinforcement of acquis in the field of migration required; 
alignment with Dublin Convention on Asylum required; police 
and law enforcement still rather weak in fight against organised 
crime (upgrading of techniques required); further legislative 
changes required to combat fraud and conuption; understaffing of 
Financial Intelligence Units is a problem; liaison officer to be 
seconded to Europol or other international orcranisations. 
33 The basis of this inventory is formed by the various Progress Reports 2000 







Ratification of European Convention on Data Protection required; 
independent supervisory authority to be established; visa policy 
very far in line but liberal visa regime with Kaliningrad and 
Belarus is seen as a problem; border control is efficient but 
further training of border and police officials required; 
understaffing of Migration Department is a problem; police 
training in specific crime fields required plus preparation of 
Lithuania's partnership of Europe!; lack of co-ordination is a 
major shortcoming in fight against corruption; efficient structures 
for judicial co-operation will have to be established at central 
level. 
New regulatory instruments have been adopted but without much 
consultation; legal approximation and strengthening 
administrative capacity need further attention; ratificaton of CoE 
convention on data protection required; visa system to be aligned; 
as far as border control is concerned, equipment, infrastructure, 
interagency co-operation and training are to be improved; need to 
conclude more readmission agreements; police co-operation (e.g. 
sending liaison officers) is a problem because of lack of 
resources; in field of anti-fraud measures, Romania should 
prepare for co-operation with OLAF; extradition is a problem; 
UN Convention on Drugs and Psychotropic Substances still to be 
ratified. 
Despite legal alignment and strengthening administrative 
capacity, more effort is required for training and co-operation 
between agencies; border controls to be made further compatible 
with the Schengen requirements; legislation to counter marriages 
of convenience to be introduced; in the field of asylum, 
implementation capacity to be build in the form of Refugee 
Authority; computer network for customs to be improved; 
alignment with the acquis- specifically regarding criminalisation 
of membership of a criminal organisation further required. 
Basic provisions of the JHA acquis are in place, but little progress 
reported in the field of judicial co-operation; some visa 
exemptions to be tackled (e.g. with Cuba and Belarus); border 
management needs further investment, but also training and 
staffing are points of attention; further alignment in the field of 
migration required, specifically concerning the admission of 3d 
country nationals for the purpose of studying etc.; definition of 
orcranised crime to be introduced in domestic law. 
A reasonable level of alignment is reported; however, compared 
with the Schengen standards, the equipment is considered quite 
poor; law on personal data protection required before it can join 
Europol; more alignment required in the domain of anti-fraud and 
anti-corruption measures, including establishment of 
administrative facilities; alignment of Malta's visa policy is 
required, as well as ratificati~ of a number of convention on civil 








With the exception of border control, the overall situation 
concerning alignment with and implementation of the JHA 
Acquis looks good. The green border with Croatia gives rise to 
concern; illegal immigration is seen as major challenge because 
Slovenia is a transit country. 
Border controls, police co-operation and the fight against fraud 
are problem areas, though progress is reported in most other JHA-
areas (e.g. signing of the CoE convention on data protection); 
border guards are understaffed, under-equipped and have no 
proper means of communication at their disposal; police 
structures are too weak to effectively combat illegal immigration 
and organised crime; drug-related crime remains significant 
I oroblem (transit). 
Ratification of data protection convention required; further 
professionalisation of the visa-system (also visa-transit system) to 
be completed; more co-operation and integrated approach 
necessary for border control; lack of adequate equipment and lack 
of focus on risk areas are problem in border control; further steps 
in alignment with Europol requirements to be taken; law 
enforcement agencies to be supported with central information 
capacity. 
Progress reported on alignment of the acquis, but further work is 
needed on strengthening the infrastructure; Poland is vulnerable 
to penetration of organised crime groups; illegal immigration 
numbers substantially reduced; border controls are sound at 
Polish-German border but need improvement elsewhere; in the 
field of asylum, Poland needs to ratify the Dublin Convention; 
1981 CoB Convention on data protection still to be ratified; 
corruption remains important issue to be addressed; dramatic 
increase in economic crime reported; more co-operation between 
law enforcement agencies required; Poland remains strong drugs-
producing and drugs-consuming country; progress urgently 
needed in the field of money-launderincr. 
Progress reported in most areas except border control; ratification 
of the CoB Convention on data protection required; on-line 
system and central registration system for visas to be established; 
susceptibility to illegal immigration and therefore much emphasis 
on the quality of the border management system; further 
alignment with EU asylum law required, specifically in 
application of the term "safe third countries"; further measures in 
the ficrht acrainst organised crime necessary. 
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The Subject of Security: A Moving Target 
Moreover, candidate countries find it hard to achieve the required Schengen I 
JHA-standards because they are continuously confronted with shifting security 
patterns. Indeed, there is considerable concern within the EU Member States34 
that some applicant states are unable to tackle transit crime, organised crime and 
illegal immigration. Organised criminal networks are easily accommodated by 
fragile political and administrative structures. Bribes and corruption facilitate the 
inter-penetration of the "upper-world" by the "under-world". The current 
practice thus far has been that EU member states submit an annual situation 
report on the state of affairs concerning organised crime in their countries. As 
EU Member States are now beginning to adopt a new strategy towards organised 
crime - which is inspired by crime prevention methods and risk analysis -
candidate countries should also be encouraged by the EU to perform a SWAT-
analysis of their economies, transport-infrastructure, wage-patterns, and so on. 
Criminal networks often operate on the waves of opportunity-structures35 ; their 
operating strategies include calculated risk (e.g. of interception of illegal 
transports) and push- and pull-factors. Meanwhile, the fight against illegal 
trafficking of human beings has become a lynch pin in the pre-accession strategy. 
In March 2001, the Swedish Presidency concluded an agreement concerning 
improved co-operation between EU Member States and the candidate countries 
to combat trafficking in human beings. It was agreed in the JHA-Council that it 
is necessary to bring the candidate countries into closer contact with the EU 
bodies for police and prosecution cooperation, Europol and Eurojust.36 
The example of transit-migration through Poland37 is a very telling 
illustration in this regard. Transit-migration is defined as "migratory movements 
to one or more countries with the intention to migrate to yet another country of 
fmal destination. These intentions or plans can develop at any stage, from the 
34 See Enlargement Strategy Paper, Report on progress towards accession by each of the 
candidate countries, 2000, at p. 6; 
~5ttp:l~eu:ope.e~.inUcomrnfenlargemen.t/report_ll_OO/strat_en.pdf Cnmmologtsts argue that accordmg to the crime opportunity theory, crime rates are 
determined by the convergence in time and place of pools of motivated offenders, suitable 
targets and insufficient informal and formal social controL Moreover, it is argued that the 
presence of large pools of motivated offenders explains the high crime rates in developing 
countries and those European countries in transition. Jan M. van Dijk, "Does Crime Pay? On 
the Relationships between Crime, Rule of Law and Economic Growth", in Forum on Crime 
and Society, Volume 1, No.l, February 2001, pp. 1-16, at p. 5. 
36 See website of the Swedish Presidency of the EU, 
http:/ I eu200 1.se/ eu200 1/news/news read.asp ?iinformati oniD= 13041. 
37 Trafficking in Migrants through Poland, Nathalie Siron & Piet van Baeveghem, supervised 
by Brice de Ruyver, Tom Vanderbeken and Gen Vermeulen, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, Maklu, 
1999. 
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initial outset to any time while in transit, a process that can take a few days or 
several years."38 A stage-wise migration can be caused by strict visa policies or 
migration measures. (A discussion which looms behind this issue is if "Fortress 
Europe" is a contributory factor in these surging illegal inunigration trends). 
Researchers established that from 1989 onwards, Poland gradually developed 
into a major transit-country, apparently with a sharp rise after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union at the end of 1991.39 Recently there has been a remarkable rise in 
(illegal) migration through Poland that originates in the Asian countries, in 
particular Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh and India. An 
important share originates from the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Ukraine and 
to a lesser degree Russia). Migrants also continue to come from Romania, 
Bulgaria40, the former Yugoslavia, and other Balkan countries. There is also a 
small proportion of Africans who travel through Poland. Among the destination 
countries are many EU Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), but also Canada, the USA and Norway 
feature on the list. Poland has also increasingly been functioning as a transit 
country for trafficking in human beings, e.g. women from the Ukraine, Russia 
and the Baltic States are brought through Poland. There they are introduced into 
the prostitution-business, after which they are 'resold' to brothel-owners in EU 
countries, Switzerland and Israel. It is also observed by the researchers that from 
1998 on, Poland seems to have lost much ofits appeal as a transit country, and it 
is argued that the transit route may have shifted to the Czech Republic. This 
change is attributed to the fact that Poland introduced a more stringent Aliens 
Act (25 June 1997) and increased the efficiency of its border control41 
The case illustrates a number of interrelated trends. First, migration 
patterns are subject to rapid fluctuation, following economic and political 
changes in other regions. Second, migration is heterogeneous and multi-national 
38 International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Transit Migration in Poland, Budapest, 
MIP !OM, 1994, p. 2. 
39 Siron & Van Baeveghem, et al., 1999, p. 22. 
39 International Organisation for Migration (!OM), Transit Migration in Poland, Budapest, 
MIP !OM, 1994, p. 2. 
40 Siron & Van Baeveghem, et al., 1999, p. 43, however also claim that for (trafficked) 
Romanians and Bulgarians, the Czech Republic is the most imponant transit-country towards 
Germany. 
41 Siron & Van Baeveghem, et al., 1999, p. 23 and 24. At the same time, the researchers have 
established that Poland has a rather liberal visa policy, as some nationalities are exempted 
from a visa duty for a short term stay. Poland's liberal visa policy is considered an important 
difficulty in the accession process. Poland however does not seem prepared to impose a 
restrictive visa policy on its Eastern neighbour, as it would have a negative influence on the 
economic activities in the border regions. A high percentage of border crossings into Poland 
seem to be of a commercial nature. (ibid, p. 106). 
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in nature and follows interconnected chains that are unfolded on a global scale.42 
If undertaken by criminal organisations, trafficking in human beings is just one 
criminal activity executed along others, such as kidnapping and abduction, trade 
in weapons, money laundering and corruption. These complicated, changeable 
and multi-national enterprises demonstrate the need for exchange of information 
and know-how between the EU-countries, the candidate countries and 
transatlantic states43. The task to collect strategic analysis of crime phenomena is 
one of Europol's competences. To facilitate information-exchange with third 
countries, data-protection regimes of a number of candidate countries have been 
upgraded and screened (Hungary, Poland, Estonia, and Slovenia). Third, the 
shifting transit route from Poland to the Czech Republic reveals that there may 
be a negative drawback for an adjacent country if unilateral changes are 
introduced into national aliens' legislation. One may cautiously conclude that 
more lenient climates of legislation and law enforcement control contribute to 
rising illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings. It also shows that the 
scenario of differentiated integration into the EU Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, may stir up mutual tension between candidate countries. Fourth, the case 
illustrates that Poland and the Czech Republic have been forced into the role of 
the cordon sanitaire around the European Union, but that they cannot cut down 
illegal inunigration movements as long as markets in Western Europe demand 
illegal labour and prostitution. 
A concern strongly emphasised by Alina Mungiu44 is that law 
enforcement and the judiciary are having to cope with outdated equipment and 
poor facilities. Compared to the sophisticated instruments of organised criminal 
networks - financed by huge illegal profit - law enforcement organisations in 
several candidate countries (especially from East Europe) are rather 
disadvantaged. The following quotation from a report from the Polish Border 
Guard makes this painfully clear: 
42 See Discussion Paper on prevention of trafficking in human beings, European Commission, 
DG Justice and Home Affairs, First Meeting of the EU Forum on the prevention of organised 
crime, 17/18 May 2001, Brussels 
(http://europa.eu.int/comrn!dgs/justice_home!index_en.htm). 
43 Several initiatives have already been established, e.g. regular meetings between CIREFI 
experts and experts from the Central and East European countries, and their participation to 
the data-exchange relating to illegal immigration. CIREFI also proposed in 1999 that the 
candidate countries participate in an early warning system for the transmission of information 
on illegal immigration and facilitator networks. During the Finnish Presidency, at a meeting 
in Turku, an initiative was launched to establish a European Centre for Monitoring Dlegal 
Migration and Trafficldng in Human Beings. 
44 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Europe's 'Desert of Tartars' Challenge: The Borders of the 
Enlarged European Union, paper presented at Reflection Group ("Diversity and Unity in the 
Enlarged European Union"), chaired by J.-L. Dehaene, 21-22 June 2001, Brussels. 
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''They (criminal groups with international relations that carry out illegal migrant 
transfer through Poland, mdb) possess big financial means, high-class communication 
equipment, exact maps, the latest noctovision equipment, fast cars, and security. They 
commission their assistants to monitor the area and border protection system and to 
find places adequate for illegal transfer.',45 
Moving away from these factual accounts, it may be observed that a repetitive 
element in the accession negotiations seems constituted by a rather functionalist 
logic which builds on the ideology that nation states should continue to 
monopolise migration and market control. However - although not accepted as 
the official view - in an era of post-sovereignty politics and globalisation, this 
ideology is under severe strain. Although economies are increasingly becoming 
'denationalised', governments continue to govern on the basis of national goals 
and frontiers46, and it is precisely this sovereignty ambition that is being 
imposed on candidate countries as the prevailing logic of control, management 
and assessment. Candidate countries, especially those situated in the Baltic and 
Central and East Europe, are landed in a catch-22 situation, as they encourage 
the growth of liberal market economies on the one hand, but are faced with the 
simultaneous demand to introduce protectionist measures on the other. 
'Big Bang' versns Flexibility in Schengen and JHA: A Contested Issue 
As far as the Schengen acquis is concerned, it has been noted that Article 8 of 
the Schengen Protocol does not allow the candidate countries to adopt and 
implement the Schengen acquis in a gradual manner, unlike the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, which managed to negotiate an opt-in 
clause at Amsterdam. This situation results in the highest standards set for 
candidate countries while current members of the EU are allowed to implement 
these requirements at their own pace.47 Helen Wallace comments upon this 
derivation as follows: 
"On the other hand, blindness (whether wilful or ignorant) about the problems of 
borders in Central and Eastern Europe entrenched an extraordinarily rigorous 
insistence in the Amsterdam text that new members must take Schengen commitments 
on 'in full', whatever the nature of the prior border regime with neighbouring 
countires not joining the EU. Here we should note the difficulty of understanding the 
reasons for, and the consequences of, exceptionalism already influencing practice 
ahead of ratification of Amsterdam and ahead of Eastern enlargement. As examples 
we should note the delicacy of Hungarian border relations with several of its 
45 Siron & Van Baeveghem, et al., 1999, p. 34. 
46 Elspeth Guild, "Primary Immigration: The Great Myths", in Elspeth Guild and Carol 
Harlow (Eds.), Implementing Amsterdam. Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 65-94, at p. 68. 
47 Anderson et al. , 200 l, see note 29 supra. 
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neighbours, and the adverse results of Poland's imposition of stronger controls over 
free movement of persons from Belarus and Ukraine under pressure from the EU."48 
This negative judgement is being joined by the gradual acknowledgement that a 
simultaneous fulfilment of the Schengen I JHA-criteria may not be achievable 
for all candidate countries. If a simultaneous integration of these countries 
proves impossible, it is acknowledged that a differentiated integration (e.g. 
stage-wise abolition of border controls) may cause tension between various 
~ountries, to the extent that their inhabitants are enjoying a liberal border-
crossing regime which may have to be replaced by toughened border controls. 
Saryusz-Wolski - who characterises the opt-in clauses of the Schengen Protocol 
as "preposterously framed derogations" for some EU members49 - argues that 
some flexibility should be granted by the EU, but that a strict application of the 
Schengen Protocol in principle would not allow for keeping the special 
arrangements that some of the candidate countries have with their neighbours. 
His argument seems to apply less to the application of flexibility in the 
enlargement process, than on the sensitivity of creating a new 'hard border' 
between the EU and neighbouring countries in East Europe. One aspect we 
should be mindful of is that the EU has significantly upgraded mechanisms 
monitoring the implementation of the Union acquis in justice and home affairs; 
moreover, both the member states and the Conunission have adopted the view 
that the formal legal enactment of the Union acquis by the applicant countries 
will not adequately guarantee also an effective implementation. Meanwhile, the 
Collective Evaluation Group under the supervision of COREPER has been made 
responsible for evaluating the enactment, application and effective 
implementation of the Union acquis.50 
In contrast to the 'big bang requirement for candidate countries, 
differentiation has been widely practised within the European Union. Introduced 
as a 'mechanism for permanent differentiation'5', flexibility has become an 
irrevocable process within the AFSJ52. We have already seen that within the 
48 In Neunreither and Wiener, 2000, p. 185. 
~9 J~:ek Saryusz-Wolski, ''The reformed European Union and the challenge of enlargement", 
m Jorg Monar and Wolfgang Wessels, The European Union after the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
hondon and N~w York, Continuum, pp. 56-69, at p. 63. 
51 
Monar, Justice and Home A!fairs in a Wider Europe: ... , 2000, on p. 16 and 17. 
Alexander C.-G. Stubb disentangles the 'plethora' of terms used in this context in 
"Negotiating Flexible Integration in the Amsterdam Treaty", in Karlheinz Neunreither 'and 
Antje Wiener (Eds.), European Integration after Alnsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and 
Prospects for Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 153-174, at p. 172 and 
174. 
52 
JOrg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider Europe: The Dynamics of Inclusion and 
Exclusion, Worki.ng Paper 07/00, "One Europe or Several?", ESRC Research Programme, on 
p. 6; see als Momca den Boer, Taming the Third Pillar: Improving the Management of Justice 
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Amsterdam Treaty on European Union, application of this principle can be 
witnessed in various outfits and qualities, for instance in the form of (partial) 
opt-outs (Title IV), opt-in clauses (Schengen Protocol), internal security clauses 
(Title IV), temporary provisions on the applicable decision-making system (Title 
IV), reinforced co-operation provisions (Title VI), "rolling ratification" (Title 
VI), and a facultative agreement concerning the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice (Title VI). Flexibility also emerges in the form of protocols and 
declarations which are appended to Title VI Conventions. Moreover, flexibility 
and differentiation are a conunon good within certain Conventions: the 
Schengen Implementing Convention provides differentiated arrangements for 
bilateral cross-border law enforcement activities (hot pursuit and other 
competences). 
Hence, within AFSJ, flexibility has been widely afplied to accommodate 
the differentiated interests of the EU Member States5 Indeed, it seems that 
"Implementing the ToA involves, among other things, implementing a form of 
free movement which is differential to an unprecedented degree."54 
Differentiated implementation seems particularly interrelated with a double 
logic which is the undercurrent of Europe's migration policy: on the one hand, 
the free movement of people has been embraced as a leading engine of 
European integration and as an encouragement of labour mobility; on the other 
hand, the free movement of people is seen as difficult to control and is has hence 
become subject of "securitisation".55 From this, it appears concept of migration 
itself can be regarded as migratory, as it is subject to continuous shifts and 
changes. In trying to combine freedom for some and restriction for others, "the 
edifice is fundamentally unstable".56 
and Home Affairs Cooperation in the EU, Maastricht, European Institute of Public 
Administration, 1998, p. 35ff. 
53 Wallace, supra, note 9. 
54 John Crowley, "Differential Free Movement and the Sociology of the "Internal Border'"', in 
Elspeth Guild and Carol Har!ow (Eds.), Implementing Amsterdam. Immigration and Asylum 
R}ghtsJn EC Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 13-33, at p. 32. 
5~ Guild, supra, note 46, observes that: "The European Union has enjoyed a rather tortured 
relationship with primary economic immigration over the last ten years at least. While on the 
one hand it has sought to improve labour mobility among the Member States on the grounds 
that primary migration improves prosperity, it has maintained a discourse against primary 
economic immigration from outside the Union.", at p. 65. 
56 Crowley, 2001, supra note 54, at p. 32 
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Are we, then, heading for a patchwork Europe? Exclusion from the 
expanding internal security zone may act as an incentive57 to the candidate 
countries to rapidly succeed with the implementation of Schengen and JHA 
requirements. At the same time, the allowance of flexibility and diversity within 
the EU has "clearly shown the current applicant countries that the EU has ceased 
to move ahead as a unitary actor in the areas of justice and home affairs."58 As 
such, the "credibility of the EU's insistence on the applicant countries taking 
over the whole of the EC/EU acquis has clearly suffered."59 From the viewpoint 
of enhancing the functional effectiveness of the emerging Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice and the political desirability of its legal, structural and 
political coherence, diversity- flexibility -should be suppressed, opines Jorg 
Monar. However, on the short tenn, the most important concern is to keep the 
momentum of the enlargement process going, now that public support inside and 
outside the European Union is beginning to wane. One of the crucial levers of 
negative public opinion in the applicant states may be situated in the experience 
of asymmetry, which may be encouraged by the disallowance of a gradual 
implementation of the Schengen acquis. 
Practice What You Preach? 
Perhaps the "Big Bang" scenario, which is accompanied by the requirement to 
have implemented the JHA acquis at once, is not such a persistent enlargement 
ideology after all. The logic of differentiation is beginning to creep into the 
negotiations with the candidate countries. Three forms of flexibility seem to 
apply. 
First, in accordance with the guidelines for the negotiations approved by 
the Luxembourg European Council and confirmed by the Helsinki European 
Council, each candidate proceeds at its own speed, depending on its degree of 
preparedness. Each candidate is assessed on it's own merits and will join the EU 
when it is able to meet the obligations of membership. 
Second, heading towards the end of the enlargement negotJ.ahons, 
transitional measures are allowed- but only in well-justified cases - whereby 
the application or part of the acquis is delayed for a specific period. 
Third, a differentiation strategy recently adopted relates to the tackling of 
the free movement of persons. After Austria and Germany exercised heavy 
57 JOrg Monar, Enlargement-Related Diversity in the EU Justice and Home Affairs: 
Challenges, Dimensions and Management Instruments, WRR (Scientific Council for 
Government Policy), The Hague, December 2000, p. 16-17. 
58 JOrg Monar, 2000, p. 12. 
59 Idem, supra fn. 58 .. 
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pressure to impose labour restrictions on neighbouring ex-communist states in 
Central and East Europe60, Hungary accepted a transitional phase of 2 to 7 years 
before the EU borders will be opened up for Hungarian workers. Likewise, 
Hungary obtained the reciprocal right to impose restrictions on workers from the 
EU. 61 Hence, a multi-speed process has been heralded with the assurances of the 
Netherlands and Sweden that they will admit Hungarian workers upon 
Hungary's accession to the EU. Other Member States are likely to follow. 
If flexibility will indeed become the new accession norm within the 
context of the JHA chapter, the question that presents itself is whether candidate 
countries perceive differentiated integration into the AFSJ as a competitive and 
pejorative process. Now that the door has effectively been opened for 
differentiated integration and multi-speed accession to the EU, new challenges 
are beginning to emerge: except for the quality of external border controls, the 
quality of internal border controls between two or more candidate countries 
demands a lot of attention. Some candidate countries have already taken the 
initiative themselves to implement a phased process of border management: the 
Czech Republic declared that it can implement the Acquis by 1 January 2003, 
but it has demanded a transitional period for the border management of its 
international airports. 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper, we have established that there are several contrastive 
pairs which constitute pointers in the enlargement discourse concerning the 
assimilation of the JHA acquis. Included in those are: sovereignty versus 
solidarity, symmetry versus asynunetry, uniformity versus differentiation, 
implementation at once versus multi-speed integration, standardisation versus 
tailor-made solutions, widening versus deepening, trust versus distrust, and 
fixation versus fluctuation. Within the context of this paper, only two of those 
have been carved out for further analysis, in particular the pairs "uniformity 
versus differentiation" and the "implementation-at-once" versus the scenario of 
"implementation-at-once". At the time of writing, the Commission is still on the 
tack of the "big-bang-scenario", where candidate countries will have to 
implement and operationalise the Schengen acquis at once upon their accession 
to the EU. 
60 A major concern in Austria and Germany is that immigrant labour from former communist 
countries will cause a nationalist backlash among their own voters; these fears seem to be 
farticularly acute in Germany as it will have parliamentary elections next year. 
1 Hungary achieved a major breakthrough in the negotiations concerning free movement of 
people, which places it in the vanguard together with Cyprus, and ahead of other frontrunners 
like Slovenia and the Czech Republic. De Volkskrant, 13 June 2001; see also JAI in the News, 
June 12. 
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Several questions remain for the future, and these are also subject to 
debate in other forums. An issue rarely brought forward is if the current JHA 
Acquis is able to cope with the challenges brought forward by the enlargement 
process itself. Whilst the policy-domain of EU police and justice co-operation in 
criminal matters is experiencing a serious move towards deepening and 
institutionalisation (e.g. in the form of operative powers for Europol, the 
establishment of Eurojust and the European Police College, more pragmatism in 
the form of mutual recognition of legal decisions), the JHA acquis needs to 
show a capacity of widening, in the sense that it needs to be flexed in a 
«horizontal manner" as welL Substantial elements of the JHA acquis may have 
to be re-addressed in the light of enlargement, such as the EU Action Plan 
against Organised Crime. More anticipation is also required with regard to the 
interpretation and application of the 'Amsterdam' provision on reinforced co-
operation: 
"In an enlarged EU, what role in criminal law enforcement has bilateral co-operation 
and reinforced co-operation between a limited number of member states? Are there 
new areas in which the candidate states would seek and profit from closer co-operation 
with member states? Is there a Gilbraltar precedent- i.e. despite Article 32 (1) (g) of 
the TEU, a state has blocked the participation of another member state in 
Schengen?"62 
Moreover, the current JHA framework of instruments of control breathes a spirit 
of uniformity: by demanding the candidate countries to implement this acquis, a 
form of approximation or even harmonization is introduced implicitly between 
these countries. A pertinent question is whether the JHA acquis - in its current 
outfit - can be considered as legally consistent and uniform. One aspect of the 
executive law-making culture that has dominated the legislative process in Title 
VI, is that" no specialized EC/EU lawyers establishes whether the legal 
instrument fits the already existing acquis.63 
Until now, the screening procedures and the communication of ''best 
practices" have very much been a one-sided process, in the sense that there 
seems to be considerable asymmetry between the EU member states and the 
lesser-resourced East and Central European candidates. Arguably, more 
attention ought to be devoted to masterminding a scenario which stimulates 
reciprocity in the exchange of innovative practices, e.g. within law enforcement 
circles. Introducing more symmetry may remove some of the resistance against 
62 Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap, "Justice and Home Affairs in an Enlarged European 
Union", paper presented at CEPS/Stefan Batory Foundation seminar, Warsaw, 23 and 24 
February 2001 (mimeo). 
63 It should be noted, however, that the Legal Service of the Council perlorms such a check on 
Title VI instruments. 
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accession to the EU now felt in some of the candidate countries. Indeed, the 
implementation of the JHA and Schengen acquis should not be fixated on 
techniques of control at the border, but should aim to reach beyond it: 
''to develop active engagement and partnership with the new eastern neighbours; to 
support their economic development, socio-political stability and administrative 
capacities; and to respect the close historical, ethnic and economic ties between states 
beyond the EU' s eastern borders and the new member states. "64 
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